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 How Do Firms Manage Their Earnings Forecast Strategy? A New Zealand Study 
Professional Summary 
Prior earnings forecast theories and empirical research studies have largely focused on 
explaining firms’ decision to issue earnings forecasts to pre-empt any expected change in 
earnings (Hirst, Koonce, and Venkataraman, 2008). Some of these studies have considered 
the difference between earnings forecasts that are routine and those are non-routine in nature 
in an attempt to refine this explanation (Chan, Faff, Ho, and Ramsay, 2007; Dunstan, Gallery, 
and Truong, 2008). In contrast to the trend of research investigating why firms decide to 
forecast earnings, our study seeks to examine how firms manage their earnings forecast 
strategy once they have decided to release earnings forecasts. Specifically, our objective is to 
investigate why firms decide to adopt a multiple earnings forecast approach (or portfolio 
approach) and consequently adopt a consistent drift strategy in earnings forecasting through 
the issue of an upward or downward series of earnings forecasts to pre-empt earnings 
announcements. 
The eight-year period from financial report period ending on 31 January 1999 to financial 
report period ending on 31 December 2005 is selected as our study period. Across this study 
period, we identify 350 NZX-listed firm years of which earnings announcements are pre-
empted by management earnings forecasts. We employ both univariate and multivariate 
statistical procedures to examine (1) firms’ decision to adopt an earnings forecast portfolio 
approach, and (2) firms’ decision to adopt a consistent drift strategy in earnings forecasting. 
The multivariate procedures control for firm-specific characteristics (i.e. firm performance, 
firm size, cross-listing status, growth prospects, and analyst coverage) known to impact the 
earnings forecasting strategy. 
Collectively, we document that in years where firms expect favourable earnings change, 
managers are more likely to adopt an earnings forecast portfolio approach (i.e. to issue a 
series of earnings forecasts) to update market expectations compared to firms expecting 
unfavourable earnings change, particularly after the introduction of the statutory-backed 
continuous disclosure regime on 1 December 2002. We also document that these good news 
firms have a greater propensity to adopt a consistent positive drift strategy in earnings 
forecasting while those with bad news are more likely to immediately update market 
expectations in earnings with a series of earnings forecasts of fluctuating signs. These 
findings indicate that firms expecting better earnings performance are more conservative in 
their earnings forecasting compared to those expecting worse earnings performance. While 
the gradual release of good news might not meet the intention of corporate regulators for the 
promotion of a continuously updated market – a market where all material information is 
released on a timely basis, the fact that firms expecting better earnings performance decide to 
release more earnings forecasts under the new continuous disclosure regime does suggest an 
improvement in the information flow to the capital market. 
These revealing findings on management earnings forecast strategy would be beneficial for 
the corporate regulators in their monitoring and enforcement practices. Given the importance 
of these findings to corporate regulators, we encourage further research to extend our 
understanding on how firms manage their earnings forecast strategy in regulated 
environments.   
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 How Do Firms Manage Their Earnings Forecast Strategy? A New Zealand Study 
Abstract 
In contrast to the trend of research investigating why firms decide to release earnings 
forecasts to pre-empt any expected change in earnings, our study investigates how firms 
manage their earnings forecast strategy once they have decided to release earnings forecasts. 
Using a sample of 350 NZX-listed firm years with balance date ending from 31 January 1999 
to 31 December 2005 for 94 companies across the statutory-backed continuous disclosure 
regime, we document that firms are more likely to adopt a multiple earnings forecast (a 
portfolio) approach in the statutory sanctions period, particularly for the group of firms 
expecting favourable earnings change. We also document that these good news firms have a 
higher propensity to gradually update the market with good news earnings forecasts while 
those with bad news are more likely to immediately correct current market earnings 
expectations. These findings indicate that firms expecting better earnings performance are 
more conservative in their earnings forecasting compared to those expecting worse earnings 
performance. Although this asymmetrical treatment of good and bad news might not meet the 
corporate regulators’ objective of a continuously updated market with an unbiased approach 
to the treatment of information, the overall increase in disclosure frequency in the statutory 
sanctions period does indicate an improvement in the information flow to the capital market. 
Keywords: management earnings forecasts, continuous disclosure, earnings forecast strategy 
JEL Classifications: G14 and K22 
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 1. Introduction 
Prior earnings forecast theories and empirical research studies have largely focused on 
investigating why firms decide to issue earnings forecasts to pre-empt any expected change in 
earnings (Hirst et al., 2008). Some of these studies have considered the difference between 
earnings forecasts that are routine and those are non-routine in nature in an attempt to refine 
this explanation (Chan et al., 2007; Dunstan et al., 2008). In contrast to the trend of research 
investigating why firms decide to forecast earnings, our paper seeks to investigate how firms 
manage their earnings forecasts strategy. In other words, our objective is to examine why 
firms decide to adopt a multiple  earnings forecast approach (or portfolio approach) and 
consequently adopt a consistent drift strategy in earnings forecasting through the issue of an 
upward or downward series of earnings forecasts to pre-empt earnings announcements. 
Using a sample of 350 NZX-listed firm years with ending balance date from 31 January 1999 
to 31 December 2005, we document that in years where firms expect favourable earnings 
change managers are more likely to issue a series of earnings forecasts to update market 
expectations compared to firms expecting unfavourable earnings change, particularly in the 
statutory-backed continuous disclosure (CD) regime period. We also document that these 
good news firms have a greater propensity to adopt a consistent positive drift strategy in 
earnings forecasting while those with bad news are more likely to immediately update market 
expectations in earnings with a series of earnings forecasts of fluctuating signs. A possible 
explanation for these findings is the fact that good news firms might be more conservative in 
releasing good news to the market. While the gradual release of good news might not meet 
the intention of corporate regulators for the promotion of a continuously updated market, the 
fact that firms expecting better performance decide to release more earnings forecasts in the 
post-statutory sanctions period suggests an improvement in the information flow to the capital 
market. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of New 
Zealand continuous disclosure environment. Section 3 provides the earnings forecast 
motivation and develops the research hypotheses. The research design is shown in Section 4. 
Section 5 presents the results and the paper concludes in Section 6. 
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 2. The New Zealand Continuous Disclosure Environment 
In response to the ongoing concerns about the under-regulated New Zealand capital market 
which has been considered out of step of international best practice, New Zealand corporate 
regulators adopted the Australian disclosure model to introduce statutory backing for the 
NZX’s continuous disclosure listing rules in December 2002. The stated motivation for the 
imposition of this regulation is to encourage investor confidence in the efficiency and 
integrity of the capital market by ensuring the timely disclosure of all material information 
(NZX Guidance Note - Continuous Disclosure). 
Prior to 1 December 2002, New Zealand public issuers were bound by continuous disclosure 
obligations under the previous listing rule 10.1.1 of the NZSE. New Zealand’s statutory 
securities law only enforced the issuance of periodic disclosures, episodic disclosures, and 
IPO-related disclosures (Erlenwein, 2003). Under Listing Rule 10.1.1, public issuers were 
required to treat information as an asset, to be used and applied for its overall benefits. Public 
issuers also had a general obligation to disclose all relevant information to the market once 
the maintenance of confidentiality ceased to have a greater value to the company concerned 
than to the public. The issuers’ obligation to the NZSE’s listing rules upon listing was purely 
contractual. Following listing, monitoring and enforcement of the rule compliance remains 
the responsibility of the NZSE. The contractual nature of the disclosure obligation led to 
scepticism about the effectiveness of Listing Rule 10.1.1. Specifically, the NZSE’s 
enforcement mechanisms were considered inadequate, the definition of relevant information 
was vague, uncertain, and broad, and the rules were inconsistent with international standards 
(Erlenwein, 2003).  
The current continuous disclosure regime involved amendments to the Securities Markets Act 
(SMA) 1988 and revisions to NZX’s Listing Rule 10.1 which were set in place on 1 
December 2002. The SMA provides a statutory framework within which the NZX Listing 
Rule 10.1 operates. As specified in section 19D of the SMA, the continuous disclosure 
provisions are defined as “provisions that require a public issuer that is a party to a listing 
agreement with a registered exchange to notify information about events or matters as they 
arise for the purpose of that information being made available to participants in the registered 
exchange’s market”. The SMA also provides an enforcement regime implemented either by 
the Securities Commission with its prosecutory role or any other person with an interest in 
any contravention of the continuous disclosure requirements. Therefore, investor protection is 
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 enhanced through an informed market in which all material information must be released on a 
timely basis.  
Coinciding with the introduction of the amended SMA on 1 December 2002, the NZX 
introduced its revised Listing Rule 10.1 to ensure compatibility with the SMA. With the 
presumption that information belongs to all of public issuers’ investors instead of to issuers 
themselves, the revised listing rules dispense with the existing requirement that information to 
be treated as an asset, to be used and applied for an issuer’s overall benefits, by requiring the 
issuers to release material information immediately once becoming aware of it. It is no longer 
for an issuer to be able to assess whether there is greater value to the issuer in keeping the 
information confidential (McLaughlin and Wallis, 2002). A listed issuer is deemed to have 
come into possession of the material information when a director or executive officer has 
become aware of it in the course of performance of his or her duties (NZX Listing Rule 
10.1.1). To assist issuers in identifying material information, guidance notes to the listing 
rules provide a non-exhaustive list of events. The first and most relevant to our study is “a 
change in the issuer’s financial forecast or expectation” from either (1) the financial results 
for the previous corresponding period, or (2) prospective financial information such as 
forecasts or projections contained in any prospects, or (3) prospective financial information 
such as forecasts or projections previously provided to the market in relation to the half-year 
period (Guidance Notes - Continuous Disclosure, p.14). 
However, similar to the old listing rules, the NZX has recognised in its revised rules that there 
are situations where the issuer should legally be allowed to withhold material information. 
The “carve-out” provisions are a vital part of the continuous disclosure regime despite not 
being explicitly incorporated into the amended SMA. According to the “carve-out” 
provisions, the non-disclosure of material information is possible when (1) a reasonable 
person would not expect the information to be disclosed, and (2) the information is 
confidential and its confidentiality is maintained, and (3) it would either be illegal to release 
the information, or it contains an incomplete proposal or negotiations, or comprises matters or 
supposition, or is insufficiently definite, or is for internal management only, or is a trade 
secret. Even if all three of these criteria are satisfied, an issuer could still be required to 
release specific information if the NZX deems disclosure necessary to prevent the 
development of a false market in the issuer’s securities. 
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 The amended SMA 1988 importantly empowers the Securities Commission to require listed 
issuers to disclose necessary information bound by the regime and to publish corrective 
statements at the firm’s expense if it is found to have contravened the continuous disclosure 
provisions. The Securities Commission must normally give the issuer at least 24 hours’ 
written notice before making the order. The order may be made more urgently in some special 
case. The issuer may face a fine of up to $30,000 if it is found to have committed a criminal 
offence with respect to an order made by the Securities Commission. The Court may also 
make civil orders requiring disclosure or corrective statements, impose pecuniary penalties of 
up to $300,000, make compensatory orders, and order the payment of the Securities 
Commission’s costs and expenses. 
3. Earnings Forecast Motivation and Hypothesis Development 
3.1 Earnings Forecast Motivation 
Management earnings forecasts are defined as “managerial disclosures predicting earnings 
prior to the expected reporting date” (King, Pownall, and Waymire, 1990, p.113). Four related 
disclosure theories seek to explain management decision to issue earnings forecasts. The 
expectation adjustment hypothesis of Ajinkya and Gift (1984) proposes that managers release 
earnings forecasts to reduce the level of information asymmetry and to align investors’ 
earnings expectation with their own. While Ajinkya and Gift (1984) assume that managers 
generally dislike large earnings surprises irrespective of the earnings surprise sign, Skinner 
(1994, 1997) extends this expectation adjustment hypothesis with the assumption that the 
costs of failing to pre-empt bad news before the earnings announcements are larger than the 
costs of failing to pre-empt good news. Thus, Skinner's (1994, 1997) litigation and reputation 
cost hypotheses argues that managers decide to release earnings forecasts to pre-empt current 
year’s change in earnings in order to avoid potential litigation costs from aggrieved investors 
as well as the potential reputation impairment costs arising from the earnings surprises, 
especially in case of expected bad news. Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) further 
develop the reputation cost hypothesis which explains the management decision to issue 
earnings forecasts as to build up and maintain their disclosure reputation. Agency theory, in 
contrast, argues that managers might also be driven by their self-interest behaviour to 
opportunistically issue self-serving earnings forecasts which might conflict with shareholders’ 
interests. Ultimately, management decision to issue earnings forecasts is tactically influenced 
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 by the legal, regulatory, and institutional environment, the expected investors’ reaction to 
earnings forecasts, the nature of information held by managers, and by managerial incentives.  
Empirical research shows that U.S. managers are more likely to issue the full content of bad 
news in one announcement relative to good news due to the strong culture of private litigation 
(Skinner, 1994; Kasznik and Lev, 1995; Soffer, Thiagarajan, and Walther, 2000; Baginski, 
Hassell, and Kimbrough, 2002). In contrast, such asymmetrical treatment between good news 
and bad news is not observed in other lower litigation risk environments such as Japan, 
Canada, and New Zealand (Baginski et al., 2002; Kato, Skinner, and Kunimura, 2006; 
Dunstan et al., 2008). 
Australian and New Zealand research on the change in the regulatory disclosure regime 
generally shows a positive impact of the statutory-backed continuous disclosure regime on 
management earnings forecasting behaviour. Investigating the extent and nature of 
management earnings forecasts for a large sample of analyst-followed companies listed on the 
ASX for the period from 1994 to 2001, Chan et al. (2007) find that the increased enforcement 
actions by the Australian Securities and Investment Commission and the additional legislative 
changes to the Australian continuous disclosure regime have significantly increased the level 
of non-routine earnings forecasts in the post 2000 period. Similarly, Dunstan et al.'s (2008) 
New Zealand study on management earnings forecasting behaviour shows significant 
increases in both the overall quantity of earnings forecasts and the quantity of non-routine 
earnings forecasts following the introduction of a statutory-backed continuous disclosure 
regime in 2002. 
3.2 The Decision to Adopt an Earnings Forecast Portfolio Approach 
Both the regulatory argument and prior Australian and New Zealand empirical evidence 
suggest an increase in the likelihood of management issuing earnings forecasts in general and 
non-routine earnings forecasts in particular in the statutory sanctions period. However, prior 
research does not address changes in disclosure strategies, in particular, whether non-
disclosing firms have increased their propensity to disclose earnings forecasts or whether 
firms having already made earnings forecasts have modified the number of forecasts they 
issue to the capital market after regulatory changes to the disclosure rules. Firms may not only 
be more likely to issue multiple earnings forecasts in general (a “portfolio” approach) and 
non-routine earnings forecasts in particular but also be more likely to issue a series of 
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 earnings forecasts (a “drift” approach) to pre-empt the current year’s change in earnings in the 
post continuous disclosure regime period. This motivates our research question about why 
firms would adopt a strategy of making a portfolio of forecasts or produce a series of forecasts 
over time rather than rely on the signalling effect of just one or two earnings forecasts in 
general or one or two non-routine earnings forecasts in particular. In the absence of New 
Zealand research on strategic earnings forecasting behaviour, it is difficult to predict the 
impact of the disclosure regime switch on management decision to adopt an earnings forecast 
portfolio approach among NZX-listed firms. On a regulatory perspective, the intention of a 
statutory-backed continuous disclosure regime is to promote a continuously informed market 
in which all material information is released on a timely basis. Therefore, a priori we would 
expect managers are more likely to update the market with a series of earnings forecasts pre-
empting current year earnings change in the statutory sanctions period. Accordingly, we test 
the following hypothesis: 
H1: Firms are more likely to adopt an earnings forecast portfolio approach 
following the introduction of NZ statutory-backed CD regime. 
3.3 The Decision to Adopt a Consistent Drift Strategy in Earnings Forecasting 
Once a firm has decided to adopt an earnings forecast portfolio approach, the next decision 
relates to how the firm should manage its earnings forecast portfolio to continuously inform 
the market. It is difficult to predict whether firms utilise a consistent drift strategy to gradually 
inform bad or good news to the market or to predict if they are more likely to issue a series of 
earnings forecasts to immediately correct current market expectation of earnings or prior 
management earnings forecast error. There is no current Australian or New Zealand research 
on how firms manage their earnings forecasts in a regulated environment. The only U.S. 
research on how firms preannounce their earnings performance of Soffer et al. (2000) reveals 
that while firms with bad news essentially release all of their news at their preannouncement 
date, firms with good news only release approximately half of their news before the official 
earnings announcements. One possible explanation for this finding is the asymmetric loss 
function faced by managers. From a managerial perspective, the cost of not disclosing bad 
news on a timely basis is greater than the cost of not disclosing good news on a timely basis. 
Disclosing bad news earlier could reduce the litigation risk and the cost of subsequent 
litigation (Skinner, 1994, 1997). Given the increased litigation risk and enforcement imposed 
by the statutory-backed continuous disclosure regime, we would expect firms with bad news 
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 are more likely to issue earnings forecasts to immediately pre-empt the current year’s change 
in earnings in the statutory sanctions period and firms with good news are more likely to use a 
consistent drift strategy to progressively keep the market informed. This argument leads to the 
following hypothesis about the management disclosure decisions: 
H2: Firms are more likely to adopt a consistent drift strategy in earnings 
forecasting when expecting good news than when expecting bad news following 
the introduction of NZ statutory-backed CD regime. 
3.4 Control variables 
Prior research has shown that the institutional environment such as analyst coverage and other 
firm characteristics such as the magnitude of earnings change, firm size, cross-listing status, 
and growth prospects influence management earnings forecasting decision regardless of 
change in disclosure regime and earnings change direction (Hirst et al., 2008). These firm 
specific characteristics are expected to be different cross-sectionally among NZX-listed firms, 
which in turn might directly impact on management decisions to adopt an earnings forecast 
portfolio approach and management decisions to adopt a consistent drift strategy in earnings 
forecasting. Therefore, we consider appropriate control variables in our research design.  
4 Research Design 
4.1 Sample 
The NZX maintains an IRG database of all firm-related information made by a large number 
of NZX-listed firms. We obtain the list of 197 NZX-listed firms as on 3 December 2004. We 
eliminate 44 overseas domiciled firms listed on the NZX which are not covered by the IRG 
database and an additional 59 firms which did not survive at least for the period from 28 
September 1999 to 13 September 2004. This leads to the final sample of 94 firms with 655 
firm years with ending balance dates from 31 January 1999 to 31 December 2005. We further 
remove 23 firm years with missing documents or with unusable earnings data and 282 firm 
years not containing at least one management earnings forecast to obtain the final sample of 
350 forecasting firm years. The sample selection procedure detail is shown in Table 1. 
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 4.2 Data Sources 
The listing status of NZX-listed firms was extracted from the Company Information section 
of the IRG Database. The cross-listing status and listing date information were obtained 
directly from the NZX. All financial accounting information including earnings, asset size, 
market capitalisation, and book value of equity and the analyst coverage information were 
taken from either the Datastream database or the Financial Information section of the IRG 
database. All management earnings forecasts were extracted from the Company 
Announcements section of the IRG Database. 
4.3 Identification of Earnings Forecast Portfolio Approach and Consistent Drift Strategy in 
Earnings Forecasting 
All management earnings forecasts from 350 forecasting firm years are classified according to 
their news content (i.e. bad, neutral, or good news). An earnings forecast is classified as good 
(bad) news if its content reveals favourable (unfavourable) earnings prospects relative to last 
periodic earnings announcement or forecast (if one has been provided since the last periodic 
earnings announcement). An earnings forecast is classified as neutral news if its content 
indicates no expected change in earnings.  
A forecasting firm year is defined as adopting an earnings forecast portfolio approach if there 
are three or more earnings forecasts being issued throughout the financial year. A forecasting 
firm year is classified as adopting a consistent negative (positive) drift strategy in earnings 
forecasting if it adopts an earnings forecast portfolio approach and provides forecasts which 
consistently contains a series of bad (good) news earnings content. 
4.4 Hypothesis Testing Procedure 
We test the two hypotheses by employing both univariate and multivariate methods in order 
to control for common firm-specific characteristics expected to have a direct impact on the 
management decision to adopt an earnings portfolio approach and a consistent drift strategy in 
earnings forecasting. The logistical regression model is employed to make inferences about 
the hypothesised relationship and to control for firm-specific characteristics. Two versions of 
the logistical regression model used to test the hypothesised forecasting behaviour are as 
follows. 
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 PORTFOLIOi,t = a0 + a1PREPOSTi,t + a2ESIGNi,t + a3ECHANGEi,t + a4ASSETi,t 
+ a5XLISTi,t + a6MVBVi,t + a7ANALYSTi,t + εi,t    (1) 
DRIFTi,t = b0 + b1PREPOSTi,t + b2ESIGNi,t + b3ECHANGEi,t + b4ASSETi,t + 
b5XLISTi,t + b6MVBVi,t + b7ANALYSTi,t + δi,t     (2) 
In equation (1), the dependent variable PORTFOLIO is an indicator variable taking the value 
of 1 if a firm year adopts an earnings forecast portfolio approach and 0 otherwise. In equation 
(2), the dependent variable DRIFT is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if a firm year 
adopts a consistent drift strategy in earnings forecasting.  
The independent variables in equations (1) and (2) are defined as follows. PREPOST (the 
change in regime proxy) is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the current financial 
reporting period ends on or after 1 December 2002 and 0 otherwise. ESIGN (the forecast news 
content proxy) is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 for a positive current period 
earnings per share change and 0 otherwise. ECHANGE (the earnings magnitude proxy) is the 
natural logarithm of the absolute value of percentage change in earnings per share deflated by 
share price at the beginning of the financial year. ASSET (the size proxy) is the natural 
logarithm of the total assets at the end of the current financial reporting period. XLIST is an 
indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is cross-listed in a foreign exchange and 0 
otherwise. MVBV (the growth or risk proxy) is the natural logarithm of the market value of 
equity divided by the book value of equity at the end of the current financial reporting period. 
ANALYST is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is followed by analysts and 
0 otherwise. 
5. Results 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Test Results 
The descriptive statistics and the results from the univariate tests are presented in Tables 2 to 
4 and show the statistics for the overall sample and the pre-CD and post-CD regime sub-
samples. Panel A of Table 2 shows the number of firm years adopting an earnings forecast 
portfolio approach. Out of 350 forecasting firm years, there are 104 (29.71%) firm years 
adopting an earnings forecast portfolio approach. In the pre-CD regime period, 34 of out of 
163 (20.86%) firm years decide to adopt an earnings portfolio approach. In the post-CD 
regime period, 70 out of 187 (37.43%) firm years adopt an earnings portfolio approach. There 
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 is a significant increase in the number of firms adopting an earnings forecast portfolio 
approach across the pre/post-statutory sanctions period. However, when partitioning the 
overall sample into negative and positive earnings change sub-samples, it is obvious that such 
significant increase is mainly driven by the group of firms expecting better earnings 
performance. While 27.87 % and 28.17% firms expecting worse earnings performance adopt 
an earnings forecast portfolio approach in the pre and post-CD regime period, respectively, 
16.67% and 43.10% firms expecting better earnings performance adopt an earnings forecast 
portfolio approach in the pre and post-CD regime period, respectively. Also, the percentage of 
firm years with positive earnings change and adopting an earnings forecast portfolio approach 
is significantly higher than the percentage of firms with negative earnings change only in the 
post-CD regime period. Therefore, H1 is partially supported by the group of firms expecting 
better earnings performance. Panel B of Table 2 displays the number of firms adopting a 
consistent drift strategy in earnings forecasting. Across the statutory sanctions period, there is 
no significant change in the proportion of firms adopting a consistent drift strategy in earnings 
forecasting for both the full sample of 104 firm years and the two negative/positive earnings 
change sub-samples. However, firms expecting better earnings performance are more likely to 
adopt a consistent drift strategy in earnings forecasting compared to firms expecting worse 
earnings performance, particularly in the sanctions period. Hence, H2 is fully supported.  
Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics for the controlled variables used in the estimation of 
the two logistical regression models. Except for the growth prospects measured by the market 
to book value ratio, all other firm-specific characteristics including the magnitude of earnings 
change, asset size, cross-listing status, and level of analyst coverage do not show any 
significant changes across the pre/post-sanctions period. Thus, it is unlikely that the 
interpretation of any changes in earnings forecasting behaviour across the pre/post sanctions 
period and firms expecting negative/positive earnings change would be confounded by these 
firm-specific characteristics. The significant difference for MVBV also highlights the necessity 
to control for growth prospects in our multivariate estimations. 
Table 4 presents the Pearson and Spearman’s Rho correlation among the continuous variables 
tested in the logistical regression models. Despite the presence of collinearity for the 
magnitude of earnings change, asset size and growth prospects variables, the correlations are 
not sufficiently high to be of concern to the subsequent multivariate analysis (Gujarati, 1995).  
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 5.2 Multivariate Regression Results 
The estimations of the two logistical regression models used to test the hypothesised 
relationships are presented in Table 5 and Table 6. Both two tables provide the regression 
results for all firm years and the two sub-samples pre/post-CD sanctions. Hypothesis 1 is 
based on the significance of the coefficient on the PREPOST indicator variable. 
Table 5 provides the results from the logistical regression model estimating the likelihood of 
firms adopting an earnings forecast portfolio approach. The PREPOST indicator variable is 
significant at the 0.01 level, indicating that firms are more likely to issue multiple earnings 
forecasts in a series in the post statutory sanctions. Consistent with the univariate results, the 
significance of the coefficient on the PREPOST indicator variable is only evident for the sub-
sample of firms subject to favourable earnings change. Therefore, H1 is only supported by the 
group of firms expecting positive earnings change. Further evidence in Table 5 shows that 
positive direction of earnings change and cross-listing status have a positive impact on 
management decision to adopt an earnings forecast portfolio strategy only in the post 
statutory sanctions period. However, the influence of analyst coverage on this decision is only 
positively significant in the pre-CD regime period.  
Table 6 presents the estimation results for management decision to adopt a consistent drift 
strategy in earnings forecasting. The significant coefficient on ESIGN indicator variable for 
the overall sample and the post-CD regime sub-sample indicates that firms expecting increase 
in earnings performance are more likely to gradually release good news to the market in a 
series of earnings forecasts while firms expecting decrease in earnings performance are more 
likely to randomly correct market expectation of earnings with multiple earnings forecasts. 
Therefore, H2 is fully supported. However, we find no significant evidence of any cross-
sectional variation on adopting this consistent drift strategy besides the change direction in 
earnings between years.  
The finding that firms expecting good news are more likely to use a positive drift strategy 
whereas firms expecting bad news are more likely to issue series of earnings forecasts of 
fluctuating signs indicates that firms are adopting differential strategies depending on 
earnings performance. The fact that this result is stronger in the post statutory sanctions 
period seems to indicate why firms are more likely to issue a greater number of earnings 
forecasts in the post-sanctions period and this is the case for only firms subject to favourable 
12 
 earnings change. A possible explanation for the fact that good news firms are more likely to 
adopt a consistent positive drift strategy is that firms are more conservative in the release of 
good news about earnings expectation. In terms of regulators’ aspiration, the encouragement 
of gradual release of good news may not meet the objective of a more continuous informed 
market. However, if prior the to the introduction of statutory sanctions, these good news firms 
in fact issue fewer and more conservative earnings forecasts then it might be concluded that 
the information flow to the market has indeed improved in the post statutory sanctions period 
which is to some extent consistent with the intention of the regulators for the promotion of a 
more timely information flow to the capital market.  
6. Conclusion 
The objective of our study is to investigate why firms decide to adopt alternative forecasting 
strategies following the introduction of a more regulated continuous disclosure environment. 
We propose that forecasting firms adopt an earnings forecast portfolio (or multiple 
forecasting) approach and adopt a consistent drift strategy involving a series of upward or 
downward earnings forecasts. Using a sample of 350 forecasting firm years with ending 
balance date from 31 January 1999 to 31 December 2005, as expected we show that firms are 
more likely to issue their earnings forecasts in a series in the post-sanctions period compared 
with the pre-sanctions period. However, these findings are only evident for the group of firms 
expecting favourable change in earnings performance. We also show that, as expected, these 
good news firms are more likely to gradually release good news to the market (i.e. adopt a 
drift strategy) while bad news firms are more likely to immediately update the market with 
any change in their earnings expectation. Such asymmetrical treatment between good news 
and bad news may not be consistent with the intention of the corporate regulators; however, 
the fact that good news firms issue more earnings forecasts in the post-statutory sanctions 
period does indicate an improvement in the information flow to the capital market. 
These revealing findings on management earnings forecast strategy would be beneficial for 
the corporate regulators in their monitoring and enforcement practices. Given the importance 
of these findings to corporate regulators, we encourage further research aimed at extending 
our understanding on how firms manage their earnings forecast strategy in regulated 
environments. 
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 Table 1 
 Sample Selection Procedure 
Selecting criteria Number of 
observations 
Sample Firms  
Total number of firms listed on NZX as on 3 December 2004 197 
Less overseas firms listed on NZX as on 3 December 2004 without IRG data (44) 
Less firms not surviving at least for the period from 28 September 1999 to 13 September 
2004 
(59) 
Total firms in the final sample 94 
Sample Firm Years  
Total firm years by 94 firms* 655 
Less firm years with missing documents or unusable earnings data for the firms (23) 
Less firm years not containing at least one management earnings forecast (282) 
Final sample of forecasting firm years 350 
* Total firm years including all firm years with ending balance date from 31 January 1999 to 31 December 2005. 
 
Table 2 
Earnings Forecast Strategy Associated with 350 Forecasting Firm Years  
 All Firm 
Years 
Pre-CD 
Regime 
Post-CD 
Regime 
Pearson Chi-
square1 
Panel A: Earnings Forecast Portfolio Approach Associated with 350 Forecasting Firm Years 
All Firm Years     
No. (%) of firm years adopting an 
earnings forecast portfolio approach 
104 (29.71%) 34 (20.86%) 70 (37.43%) 11.455** 
Observations 350 163 187  
Negative Earnings Change     
No. (%) of firm years adopting an 
earnings forecast portfolio approach 
37 (28.03%) 17 (27.87%) 20 (28.17%) 0.002 
Observations 132 61 71  
Positive Earnings Change     
No. (%) of firm years adopting an 
earnings forecast portfolio approach 
67 (30.73%) 17 (16.67%) 50 (43.10%) 17.819** 
Observations 218 102 116  
Pearson Chi-square2 0.289 2.902^ 4.194*  
Panel B: Earnings Forecast Portfolio Management Associated with 104 Firm Years adopting an earnings 
forecast portfolio approach 
All Firm Years     
No. (%) of firm years adopting a 
consistent drift strategy in earnings 
forecasting 
64 (61.54%) 19 (55.88%) 45 (64.29%) 0.683 
Observations 104 34 70  
Negative Earnings Change     
No. (%) of firm years adopting a 
consistent drift strategy in earnings 
forecasting 
16 (43.24%) 7 (41.18%) 9 (45.00%) 0.055 
Observations 37 17 20  
Positive Earnings Change     
No. (%) of firm years adopting a 
consistent drift strategy in earnings 
forecasting 
48 (71.64%) 12 (70.59%) 36 (72.00%) 0.012 
Observations 67 17 50  
Pearson Chi-square2 8.122** 2.983^ 4.536*  
^, *, ** Characteristics are significantly different at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
1 Showing the Pearson Chi-square of difference between Pre-CD and Post-CD Regime samples. 
2 Showing the Pearson Chi-square of difference between Negative and Positive Earnings Change samples. 
A management earnings forecast is an announcement made to the NZX pre-empting a current period earnings 
change. A firm year adopts an earnings forecast portfolio approach if it contains three or more management earnings 
forecasts. A firm year adopts a consistent drift strategy in earnings forecasting if it consistently contains bad news or 
good news earnings forecasts. A firm year is classified as a Pre-CD Regime (Post-CD Regime) firm year if its financial 
reporting period ends before (on or after) 1 December 2002. Earnings Change is the change in yearly earnings per 
16 
 share deflated by share price at the beginning of the current financial year.  
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  Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics 
 All Firm Years Pre-CD Period Post-CD Period t-stat (Mann 
Whitney z-
value)/Pearson chi-
square 
Variables Mean 
(Median)/Frequency 
(Percentage) 
Mean 
(Median)/Frequenc
y (Percentage) 
Mean 
(Median)/Frequenc
y (Percentage) 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for forecasting firm years 
 N = 350 N = 163 N = 187  
ECHANGE -3.287 (-3.401) -3.101 (-3.230) -3.449 (-3.657) -1.931^ (-1.881^) 
Total Assets ($ million) 4,239.0 (226.5) 4,767.4 (199.5) 3,778.5 (255.1) -0.411 (1.311) 
ASSET  19.284 (19.238) 19.183 (19.111) 19.373 (19.357) 0.998 (1.323) 
MVBV 0.383 (0.376) 0.263 (0.205) 0.487 (0.467) 2.905** (2.647**) 
ESIGN (positive) 218 (62.29%) 102 (62.58%) 116 (62.03%) 0.011 
XLIST (cross-listed) 92 (26.29%) 41 (25.15%) 51 (27.27%) 0.202 
ANALYST (followed by 
analysts) 
219 (62.57%) 99 (60.74%) 120 (64.17%) 0.439 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for firm years adopting an earnings forecast portfolio approach 
 N =104 N = 34 N = 70  
ECHANGE -3.507 (-3.640) -3.310 (-3.382) -3.603 (-3.850) -0.893 (-1.095) 
Total Assets ($ million) 4,855.5 (260.1) 7,232.7 (347.0) 3,700.9 (242.5) -0.630 (-0.981) 
ASSET  19.462 (19.377) 19.684 (19.658) 19.354 (19.306) -0.977 (-0.974) 
MVBV 0.452 (0.461) 0.219 (0.251) 0.565 (0.520) 2.285* (1.871^) 
ESIGN (positive) 67 (64.42%) 17 (50.00%) 50 (71.43%) 4.585* 
XLIST (cross-listed) 35 (33.65%) 11 (32.35%) 24 (34.29%) 0.038 
ANALYST (followed by 
analysts) 
73 (70.19%) 28 (82.35%) 45 (64.29%) 3.570^ 
^, *, ** Characteristics are significantly different at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (two-tailed). A firm year is classified 
as a Pre-CD Regime (Post-CD Regime) firm year if its financial reporting period ends before (on or after) 1 December 2002. 
ECHANGE is the natural logarithm of the absolute value of percentage change in earnings per share deflated by share price at 
the beginning of the financial year. Total Assets is the total assets at the end of the current financial reporting period. ASSET is the 
natural logarithm of total assets at the end of the current financial reporting period. MVBV is the natural logarithm of the market 
value of equity divided by the book value of equity at the end of the current financial reporting period. XLIST is an indicator 
variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is cross-listed in a foreign exchange and 0 otherwise. ANALYST is an indicator variable 
taking the value of 1 if the firm is followed by analysts and 0 otherwise. 
 
 
Table 4 
Pearson and Spearman’s Rho Correlation Among Continuous Variables 
Panel A: Correlation among variables for the forecasting firm years (N = 350) 
Variables ECHANGE ASSET MVBV 
ECHANGE 1.000 -0.063 -0.175** 
ASSET -0.112* 1.000 -0.132* 
MVBV -0.170** -0.113* 1.000 
Panel B: Correlation among variables for firm years adopting an earnings forecast portfolio approach (N = 104) 
Variables ECHANGE ASSET MVBV 
ECHANGE 1.000 -0.154 0.005 
ASSET -0.207* 1.000 -0.139 
MVBV -0.003 -0.113 1.000 
The Pearson and Spearman’s Rho Correlations are presented in the lower left and upper right hand side of the table, respectively. 
*, ** Characteristics are significantly correlated at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively (two-tailed). ECHANGE is the natural 
logarithm of the absolute value of percentage change in earnings per share deflated by share price at the beginning of the 
financial year. ASSET is the natural logarithm of the total assets at the end of the current financial reporting period. MVBV is the 
natural logarithm of the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity at the end of the current financial reporting 
period. 
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 Table 5 
Logistic Regression Analysis of Factors Associated with the Decision to Adopt an Earnings Forecast 
Portfolio Approach – 31 January 1999 to 31 December 2005 
PORTFOLIOi,t = a0 + a1PREPOSTi,t + a2ESIGNi,t + a3ECHANGEi,t + a4ASSETi,t + a5XLISTi,t + a6MVBVi,t + 
a7ANALYSTi,t + εi,t 
  All Firm Years Pre-CD Regime Post-CD Regime 
Variables Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient 
(z-stat.) 
Coefficient 
(z-stat.) 
Coefficient 
(z-stat.) 
 
Intercept 
 
 
-0.356 
(-0.190) 
-1.134 
(-0.310) 
1.952 
(0.870) 
 
PREPOST + 
0.811 
(3.220**)   
 
ESIGN  
0.151 
(0.600) 
-0.546 
(-1.320) 
0.702 
(2.110*) 
 
ECHANGE + 
-0.082 
(-1.080) 
-0.057 
(-0.430) 
-0.140 
(-1.390^) 
 
ASSET + 
-0.092 
(-0.900) 
-0.053 
(-0.260) 
-0.191 
(-1.530^) 
 
XLIST  
0.632 
(1.760^) 
0.258 
(0.430) 
1.084 
(2.250*) 
 
MVBV  
-0.039 
(-0.210) 
-0.255 
(-0.790) 
0.110 
(0.460) 
 
ANALYST + 
0.419 
(1.380^) 
1.363 
(2.290*) 
-0.101 
(-0.270) 
Pseudo R2  0.046 0.073 0.048 
Model Chi-square  19.590** 12.100^ 11.900^ 
N  350 163 187 
^, *, ** Significant at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (one-tailed test when coefficient sign is predicted, two-tailed test 
when coefficient sign is not predicted), respectively. PORTFOLIO is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if a 
firm year adopts an earnings forecast portfolio approach and 0 otherwise. PREPOST is an indicator variable taking 
the value of 1 if the current financial reporting period ends on or after 1 December 2002 and 0 otherwise. ESIGN is an 
indicator variable taking the value of 1 for a positive current period earnings per share change and 0 otherwise. 
ECHANGE is the natural logarithm of the absolute value of percentage change in earnings per share deflated by share 
price at the beginning of the financial year. ASSET is the natural logarithm of the total assets at the end of the current 
financial reporting period. XLIST is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is cross-listed in a foreign 
exchange and 0 otherwise. MVBV is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity divided by the book value of 
equity at the end of the current financial reporting period. ANALYST is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if 
the firm is followed by analysts and 0 otherwise. 
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 Table 6 
Logistic Regression Analysis of Factors Associated with the Decision to Adopt a Consistent Drift Strategy 
in Earnings Forecasting – 31 January 1999 to 31 December 2005 
DRIFTi,t = b0 + b1PREPOSTi,t + b2ESIGNi,t + b3ECHANGEi,t + b4ASSETi,t + b5XLISTi,t + b6MVBVi,t + 
b7ANALYSTi,t + δi,t 
  All Firm Years Pre-CD Regime Post-CD Regime 
Variables Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient 
(z-stat.) 
Coefficient 
(z-stat.) 
Coefficient 
(z-stat.) 
 
Intercept 
 
+/- 
-3.199 
(-0.790) 
-4.967 
(-0.450) 
-3.897 
(-0.820) 
 
PREPOST +/- 
-0.100 
(-0.200)   
 
ESIGN +/- 
1.143 
(2.520*) 
1.350 
(1.600) 
1.295 
(2.200*) 
 
ECHANGE +/- 
-0.150 
(-1.000) 
-0.256 
(-1.000) 
-0.081 
(-0.430) 
 
ASSET +/- 
0.138 
(0.630) 
0.197 
(0.320) 
0.173 
(0.680) 
 
XLIST +/- 
-0.213 
(-0.310) 
-1.559 
(-0.900) 
0.312 
(0.390) 
 
MVBV +/- 
0.420 
(1.230) 
0.248 
(0.410) 
0.624 
(1.360) 
 
ANALYST +/- 
-0.413 
(-0.690) 
0.359 
(0.220) 
-0.745 
(-1.070) 
Pseudo R2  0.078 0.135 0.091 
Model Chi-square  10.790 6.280 8.320 
N  104 34 70 
^, *, ** Significant at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (one-tailed test when coefficient sign is predicted, two-tailed test 
when coefficient sign is not predicted), respectively. DRIFT is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if a firm year 
adopts a consistent drift strategy in earnings forecasting. PREPOST is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the 
current financial reporting period ends on or after 1 December 2002 and 0 otherwise. ESIGN is an indicator variable 
taking the value of 1 for a positive current period earnings per share change and 0 otherwise. ECHANGE is the natural 
logarithm of the absolute value of percentage change in earnings per share deflated by share price at the beginning of 
the financial year. ASSET is the natural logarithm of the total assets at the end of the current financial reporting 
period. XLIST is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is cross-listed in a foreign exchange and 0 
otherwise. MVBV is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity at the end 
of the current financial reporting period. ANALYST is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is followed 
by analysts and 0 otherwise. 
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